ABSTRACT
1. In December 1999, Verizon became the first RBOC to secure permission to provide in-region long distance (i.e., interLATA) service (in New York State). SBC followed suit (in Texas) in June 2000. As of January 1, 2003, the RBOCs had received permission to provide in-region interLATA service in thirty-five states. (http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications.)
2. Similar concerns led to the divestiture of the Bell System in 1984. See, for example, Faulhaber (1987, p. 84 ).
1. Introduction.
In many important industries, regulated suppliers of essential upstream products are capable of operating in unregulated downstream markets. For example, in the telecommunications industry, the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) supply access to the local telecommunications network, and they could deliver long distance telephone service if they were permitted to do so.
Until recently, though, regulators have forbidden the RBOCs from providing long distance telephone service. 1 A primary rationale for this prohibition is that it prevents the RBOCs from engaging in activities that unduly favor their long distance affiliates at the expense of their downstream rivals.
Such activities include: (1) providing inferior service to competitors, perhaps in part by increasing the relative frequency with which their calls are blocked (Bernheim and Willig, 1996, p. 4.10) ; (2) delaying competitors' attempts to implement new and improved services (Economides, 1998; Kang and Weisman, 2001 ); (3) withholding crucial information from competitors about how they might best utilize the network to provide valued services to their customers (Bernheim and Willig, 1996, p. 4.10; Economides, 1998) ; and (4) structuring services and standards to favor the operations of their downstream affiliates at the expense of rivals (Bernheim and Willig, 1996, p. 4.6; Beard et al., 2001 ).
2
The economic literature refers to activities of this sort that disadvantage downstream rivals as sabotage, and typically assumes that sabotage serves to raise the operating costs of downstream rivals. The literature concludes that by raising the costs of downstream rivals, sabotage generally increases the profit of the downstream affiliate of the vertically integrated producer. This is the case 6. As products become more homogeneous, the downstream division of the integrated firm is able to satisfy more of the customer demand that is displaced by cost-increasing or demand-reducing sabotage. This effect ensures that sabotage provides larger downstream gains and smaller upstream losses for the integrated firm under some conditions, and so will be pursued more vigorously.
7. Although our formal analysis considers the setting where a regulator sets the price charged by a monopoly upstream producer, our basic qualitative conclusions have broader relevance. As Economides (1998) , Mandy (2000) , and others point out, concerns about potential sabotage arise in many industries, including the computer software industry.
-4 -supplier's incentives for sabotage when downstream producers engage in Cournot competition. The corresponding incentives for sabotage when downstream firms engage in Bertrand competition are analyzed in section 3. In section 4, linear versions of the models are analyzed to determine how incentives for sabotage vary with the degree of product differentiation. We identify plausible conditions under which the incentives for sabotage increase systematically as products become more homogeneous. 6 However, we also demonstrate that sabotage does not always vary monotonically with the degree of product homogeneity.
This research concludes in section 5, where we discuss the implications of our findings and directions for future research. We emphasize that our finding that demand-reducing sabotage is often unprofitable does not imply that the potential for sabotage should be ignored when designing public policy toward vertical integration in regulated industries. 7 Instead, our findings help to identify the types of sabotage that may be most problematic in practice and the industry conditions under which the incentives for sabotage are likely to be most pronounced.
Cournot Competition.
First consider the setting in which the downstream firms engage in Cournot (quantity-setting)
competition. For simplicity, we analyze duopoly competition between the downstream affiliate of the integrated producer and an unaffiliated rival. The rival's fixed cost of production is denoted and its constant marginal cost of production (absent any cost-increasing sabotage and 8. We follow both the literature and common practice by examining uniform, non-discriminatory access prices. We assume the access price exceeds the upstream marginal cost of production for expositional convenience. The qualitative changes that would arise if access were priced below cost will become apparent as we proceed. Notice in particular that upstream profit increases as the demand for access declines when . By focusing on the setting where we avoid this (obvious and largely uninteresting) reason for sabotaging rivals' operations. The costs of sabotage are assumed to be non-negative and to increase with the level of 10. As Reiffen (1998) points out, higher levels of sabotage could reduce upstream operating costs. When this is the case, sabotage will offer benefits to the upstream firm in addition to those that we identify below. We abstract from these considerations for expositional simplicity, although we will often consider the benchmark setting where sabotage is not costly (so = 0 for all ).
11. Here and throughout the ensuing discussion, stated inequalities are assumed to hold for all values of the relevant variables, unless otherwise noted.
12. To ensure compact strategy spaces, we presume that at some finite > 0 and at some finite > 0. the maximum price the rival can set for all output levels (i.e., ).
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When the affiliate and the rival sell and units of output, respectively, and when the upstream producer undertakes and units of cost-increasing and demand-reducing sabotage, respectively, upstream profit, , is:
The corresponding downstream profit of the affiliate, is:
and the corresponding profit of the rival, , is:
13. In practice, vertically integrated producers are sometimes required to conduct their downstream operations through a separate subsidiary. A separate subsidiary may value its own profit more highly than it values the profit of the integrated firm. Our main qualitative conclusions are readily shown to persist in such a setting. We provide further thoughts on this issue in the concluding section.
14. See Bulow et al. (1985) . A sufficient condition for quantities to be strategic substitutes in the present setting is that 0 for = , , so that the inverse demand curve facing each firm becomes steeper as its opponent's output increases.
-7 -(2.3) denotes the total profit of the integrated firm.
We focus on the case in which the upstream and downstream divisions of the integrated firm seek to maximize the firm's total profit. 13 In this case, after the upstream firm observes the regulated access price, it implements the amount of sabotage that maximizes , anticipating the downstream activity to follow. After observing the access price and the established levels of sabotage, the downstream producers select their output levels noncooperatively and simultaneously.
The affiliate chooses to maximize and the rival chooses to maximize The chosen quantity levels constitute a Nash equilibrium. After the quantities are set, market-clearing prices are established, outputs are sold, and profits are realized. This interaction is not repeated.
We adopt the standard assumption that downstream quantities are strategic substitutes (so for . 14 This assumption ensures that an increase in the output of one firm reduces the marginal return from increased output to the other firm or, equivalently, increases the marginal return from decreased output to the other firm. Consequently, the subgame in which the affiliate chooses and the rival chooses is supermodular (Topkis, 1995; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Vives, 1999, pp. 32-34) . Therefore, if increases in sabotage systematically reduce the rival's incremental return from expanded output (i.e., if and for all ), higher levels of sabotage will reduce the rival's equilibrium 15. The effects of sabotage on the incremental return of the integrated firm need not be considered because neither sabotage parameter enters . The same is not true in the Bertrand analysis of section 3.
16. It follows from Vives (1999, pp. 33-34 ) that an equilibrium exists in the setting under consideration. If the equilibrium is not unique, the conclusions in Lemma 2.1 (and all ensuing formal conclusions) pertain to the extremal equilibria (Vives, 1999, pp. 34-35) .
17. It can be shown that the equilibrium in the Cournot subgame will be unique under the maintained assumptions if, in addition, the inverse demand curves are concave in own quantities, equal increases in both downstream outputs render each competitor's price more sensitive to its own output, and ownprice effects outweigh cross-price effects (i.e., if , , and for ). When the Cournot equilibrium is unique and interior: (i) the equilibrium output of the -8 -output and increase the affiliate's equilibrium output (Vives, 1999, p. 35 affiliate strictly increases and the rival's equilibrium output strictly decreases as cost-increasing sabotage increases; and (ii) the affiliate's equilibrium output strictly increases and the rival's equilibrium output strictly decreases as demand-reducing sabotage increases if assumption (A2.1) holds. These conclusions can be proved using conventional comparative static analysis (Mandy and Sappington, 2001 ).
-9 -Lemma 2.1 reports an unambiguous impact of cost-increasing sabotage on downstream outputs.
By raising the rival's operating costs, cost-increasing sabotage induces the rival to reduce its output.
The reduction in the rival's output shifts outward the affiliate's demand curve. In response, the affiliate increases its output.
In contrast, the impact of demand-reducing sabotage is ambiguous in general. Because it shifts the rival's inverse demand curve inward, one effect of demand-reducing sabotage is to encourage the rival to reduce its output. A countervailing effect is also possible, though. If demand-reducing sabotage renders the rival's inverse demand curve less steep, so that a smaller price reduction is required to sell any given increase in output, the rival may prefer to expand its output. However, if demand-reducing sabotage shifts the rival's inverse demand curve inward and makes it more steep (as when assumption (A2.1) holds), demand-reducing sabotage will induce the rival to reduce its output by unambiguously reducing the marginal value of increased output to the rival. This reduction in the rival's output shifts the affiliate's demand curve outward. In response to the increase in the demand for its product, the affiliate increases its output.
When sabotage induces the rival to reduce its output, the resulting increase in demand for the affiliate's product ensures higher downstream profit for the affiliate in standard fashion (e.g., Dixit, 1986; Vives, 1999, p. 102) . Therefore, absent upstream effects, cost-increasing sabotage always increases the profit of the integrated firm, as does demand-reducing sabotage that does not decrease the sensitivity of the rival's price to its output. These conclusions are recorded formally as Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. Upstream effects are said to be absent when the upstream profit margin is zero (so and sabotage is not costly (so for all
18. This conclusion reflects the insights of Weisman (1995) and Weisman (1998, 1999) , for example.
-10 -Proposition 2.1. When upstream effects are absent and the downstream competitors engage in Cournot competition, the upstream producer will undertake cost-increasing sabotage.
Proposition 2.2. When upstream effects are absent, assumption (A2.1) holds, and the downstream competitors engage in Cournot competition, the upstream producer will undertake demandreducing sabotage.
Upstream effects need not be entirely absent to ensure that sabotage will arise in equilibrium.
As long as the direct costs of initial increments in sabotage ( and and the upstream profit margin are sufficiently small, the increase in the affiliate's downstream profit that sabotage engenders will outweigh any countervailing decrease in upstream profit.
However, since sabotage can reduce the rival's downstream output, it can thereby reduce the rival's demand for access. Consequently, if the upstream profit margin is sufficiently large, sabotage can reduce the upstream profit more than it increases the downstream profit of the integrated firm. If it does so, sabotage will not arise in equilibrium.
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Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that, at least under the identified conditions, demand-reducing sabotage acts very much like cost-increasing sabotage. Both increase the downstream profit but may decrease the upstream profit of the integrated firm. As the analysis in section 3 reveals, this conclusion is sensitive to the type of competition that prevails downstream.
3. Bertrand Competition.
Now consider a setting that is analogous to the setting analyzed in section 2 except that the downstream firms engage in Bertrand (price-setting) competition rather than Cournot (quantitysetting) competition. The notation employed to analyze this setting is identical to the notation 19. We assume the existence of prices ( ) above marginal costs such that and . This assumption ensures that the strategy spaces and are compact. Notice that all values of below marginal cost can be eliminated from without loss of generality because such values are not optimal. In contrast, although values of below the rival's marginal cost, , are not optimal, generally cannot be included as part of the lower bound on when citing standard theorems about supermodular games. Such inclusion would render the strategy space dependent on the comparative static parameter .
20. Since , a sufficient condition for for all is that the inverse demand curve facing each downstream competitor becomes steeper as its opponent's price increases (i.e., for ). This condition is not sufficient to ensure for all because may be below . must exceed everywhere on to ensure that globally.
-11 -developed above except that the demand curves facing the affiliate and the rival are denoted and , respectively, where denotes the price set by downstream competitor
The products sold by the two downstream competitors continue to be gross substitutes (so for = in this Bertrand setting. Furthermore, the maximum amount that each downstream firm can sell declines as its price increases (so for ). In addition, demand-reducing sabotage continues to reduce demand for the rival's product (so .
In this Bertrand setting, for given prices and sabotage levels, the profit of the upstream and downstream divisions of the integrated firm and the rival are, respectively:
; (3.1)
; and (3.2)
again denotes the total profit of the integrated firm.
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We adopt the standard assumption that downstream prices are strategic complements (i.e., for ). 20 This assumption ensures that an increase in one firm's price increases 21 . See Vives (1999, p. 151 ) and the references cited in section 2.
22. This potential countervailing effect is analogous to the potential countervailing effect of demandreducing sabotage under Cournot competition, but it works in the opposite direction. Under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, the effect of demand-reducing sabotage will be unambiguous only if it affects the slope of the rival's inverse demand so as to reinforce the inward shift of the inverse demand. The reinforcement arises under Cournot competition when the inverse demand becomes steeper, which renders a quantity reduction more profitable for the rival. The reinforcement arises under Bertrand competition when the inverse demand curve becomes less steep, which renders a price decrease more profitable for the rival.
-12 -the marginal return to the other firm from an increase in its price. Consequently, the Bertrand subgame is supermodular. 21 Therefore, if increases in sabotage systematically increase (respectively, reduce) both firms' incremental returns from raising their prices, higher levels of sabotage will increase (respectively, reduce) the equilibrium prices of both the affiliate and the rival (Vives, 1999, p. 35 ).
Higher levels of cost-increasing sabotage always increase the rival's incremental return from raising its price (i.e., = > 0). This is because, by raising its price, the rival reduces the number of units of output on which it incurs the higher marginal cost caused by the increased cost-increasing sabotage. Moreover, cost-increasing sabotage does not affect the affiliate's incremental return from raising its price (i.e., ). Therefore, as reported in Lemma 3.1 below, cost-increasing sabotage will never cause downstream prices to decline.
The effects of demand-reducing sabotage are more complicated under Bertrand competition, as they are under Cournot competition. Demand-reducing sabotage shifts the rival's inverse demand curve inward, which encourages the rival to reduce its price. However, two countervailing effects could arise. First, if demand-reducing sabotage were to reduce the sensitivity of the rival's demand to its price, the rival could increase its price without suffering as great a reduction in quantity demanded. Consequently, the rival might prefer to set a higher price. 22 Second, if demand-reducing 23. No analogue to this second potential countervailing effect arises under Cournot competition. This is because the Cournot affiliate conjectures that the rival's quantity is fixed (i.e., unresponsive to demandreducing sabotage), and it is the rival's quantity, not its price, that directly enters the affiliate's objective. The Cournot affiliate thus anticipates no effect on upstream profit from an increase in demand-reducing sabotage.
24. When analyzing changes in we can, without loss of generality, consider a modified version of the game in which the strategy space of the rival is . In this modified game, for is sufficient for strategic complementarity, is sufficient for , and is sufficient for .
25. It follows from Vives (1999, pp. 33-34 ) that an equilibrium exists in the setting under consideration. If the equilibrium is not unique, the conclusions in Lemma 3.1 (and all ensuing formal conclusions) pertain to the extremal equilibria (Vives, 1999, pp. 34-45 ).
-13 -sabotage were to render the rival's demand more responsive to increases in the affiliate's price, the affiliate might prefer to increase its price. The higher price could conceivably induce a sufficiently large increase in the rival's output, and thus its demand for access, as to increase upstream profit. 26. It can be shown that the equilibrium in the Bertrand subgame is unique under the maintained assumptions if, in addition, assumption (A3.4) (stated below) holds. When the Bertrand equilibrium is unique and interior: (i) the equilibrium prices of both the affiliate and the rival strictly increase as costincreasing sabotage increases; and (ii) the equilibrium prices of both the affiliate and the rival strictly decrease as demand-reducing sabotage increases if assumptions (A3.1) and (A3.2) hold. These conclusions can be proved using conventional comparative static analysis (Mandy and Sappington, 2001 ). 27. Notice that conditions (ii) and (iii) of assumption (A3.4) hold, for example, when demand curves are additively separable and concave in prices (i.e., when and for = and for = 1, 2).
28. As indicated in footnote 26 and demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3.3, assumption (A3.4) ensures the Bertrand equilibrium is unique and stable. A relatively strong assumption like assumption (A3.4) is required to ensure that demand-reducing sabotage will not arise in equilibrium even though the Bertrand subgame is supermodular and has monotone marginal payoffs under assumptions (A3.1) and (A3.2). This is because supermodularity and monotonicity of marginal payoffs do not guarantee monotonicity of equilibrium payoffs in the presence of potentially countervailing upstream effects. Together, assumptions (A3.3) and (A3.4) ensure that initial price reductions both reduce the potential downstream gains from further price reductions for the affiliate and the rival and render further price reductions by the affiliate more costly in terms of reduced access demand by the rival.
Consequently, the downstream and direct upstream effects of demand-reducing sabotage outweigh its indirect upstream effect (i.e., increased rival demand for access due to induced price reductions) under these conditions, and so sabotage will not be profitable for the integrated firm. This conclusion is stated formally in Proposition 3.3.
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29. Under the conditions of Proposition 3.3, demand-reducing sabotage causes a strict decline in the profit of the integrated supplier, even if the sabotage is costless. Therefore, the integrated supplier would refrain from demand-reducing sabotage even if (as Reiffen (1998) suggests) the supplier experienced some cost savings by doing so, provided the cost savings were not too pronounced. Furthermore, since demand-reducing sabotage reduces the integrated supplier's profit, the supplier might benefit by undertaking actions that increase (rather than decrease) the demand for the rival's product.
30. Demand-reducing sabotage can strictly reduce the profit of the integrated firm. Consequently, if costincreasing and demand-reducing sabotage are inextricably linked, the losses from demand-reducing sabotage may outweigh the gains from cost-increasing sabotage, and so the integrated producer may refrain from both types of sabotage. The two types of sabotage may be inextricably linked, for example, when providing inferior quality access both imposes costs on a rival and reduces customer perception of the rival's reliability. We thank Dennis Weisman for pointing out this possibility.
-17 - Sabotage can benefit the integrated producer by enabling the affiliate to capture some of the customer demand that would otherwise accrue to the rival. The increase in demand for the affiliate's product that arises as the rival's equilibrium output declines in response to sabotage generally will vary with the degree of product differentiation in the industry. Economides (1998) It is readily verified that the Cournot equilibrium in the linear setting is unique (Vives, 1999, p. 158) and stable. It is also readily shown that when they are non-negative, equilibrium output levels in the linear setting under Cournot competition are:
, and (4.3)
, (4.4) where We focus on the setting of greatest interest where, in the absence of sabotage, the affiliate and rival both supply strictly positive levels of output in equilibrium. From , which is the level of sabotage that drives the rival's equilibrium output to zero.
As noted above, Economides (1998) and Mandy (2000) have shown that the integrated firm will undertake the foreclosure level of sabotage in the linear setting when products are homogeneous and the affiliate's operating cost does not exceed the rival's operating cost. When products are homogeneous, the affiliate is best able to capture rival demand that is displaced by sabotage.
Consequently, as long as the affiliate is at least as efficient as the rival in serving customers, the integrated firm will effectively transfer all of the rival's demand to the affiliate by undertaking the foreclosure level of sabotage. For completeness, this finding is recorded as Observation 4.2.
Observation 4.2. (Economides, 1998; Mandy, 2000) . Suppose the affiliate's downstream cost is no larger than the rival's downstream cost (so . Then the integrated producer will 35. A weaker sufficient condition is .
-21 -undertake the foreclosure level of sabotage when products are homogeneous in the linear setting with Cournot competition (i.e., when .
In contrast, the integrated firm will have no incentive to reduce the rival's output when products are fully differentiated (i.e., when . In this case, reduced rival output does not increase demand for the affiliate's product. Consequently, sabotage only serves to reduce upstream demand for the input, and thereby reduces the profit of the integrated firm whenever its upstream margin is positive. This conclusion is stated as Observation 4.3. . This is the case because sabotage increases downstream profit when and does not reduce upstream profit when (see equations (A4.14) and (A4.19) in the Appendix).
-22 -such that if and if .) 36 In contrast, when the rival has lower operating costs than the affiliate, incentives for sabotage do not necessarily increase monotonically with the degree of product homogeneity, as Observation 4.5 reports.
Observation 4.5. Suppose the upstream margin for the integrated firm is relatively large (i.e., and the rival's operating cost is small relative to the affiliate's operating cost (i.e., ). Then the integrated firm may undertake more sabotage as products become less homogeneous (i.e., may increase from to as declines over some ranges).
The non-monotonic relationship between sabotage and product homogeneity identified in Observation 4.5 can arise because of the following two considerations. First, recall that when the rival has lower operating costs than the affiliate, the integrated firm may prefer to refrain from sabotage even when products are homogeneous (Mandy, 2000) . Although sabotage would secure greater downstream profit for the affiliate, it would sacrifice too much upstream profit by reducing the rival's relatively large demand for the input. Thus, when the upstream margin is of intermediate magnitude, the integrated firm can have a slight preference to refrain from sabotage when products are homogeneous.
Second, the rival's output can fall as the products become less homogeneous. It will do so if the increase in the affiliate's output caused by increased product differentiation is large enough to shift the rival's equilibrium inverse residual demand curve to the left. Now consider an integrated firm that has an upstream margin of intermediate magnitude (and 37 . Indeed, it can be shown that when the affiliate and rival always produce absent sabotage, the amount of cost-increasing sabotage that the integrated producer undertakes is non-decreasing in the degree of product homogeneity in the linear setting with Bertrand competition.
38. The foreclosure level of cost-increasing sabotage under Bertrand competition is the level that inflates the rival's marginal cost to the point where any price for the rival's product that exceeds this marginal cost places no effective constraints on the affiliate.
-23 -so has a slight preference to refrain from sabotage when products are homogeneous) and that faces a rival whose residual inverse demand decreases as products become slightly differentiated. A small increase in product differentiation causes upstream profit to decrease (because the rival's demand for the input declines) and downstream profit to increase (because the affiliate's output rises). The reduction in input demand reduces upstream profit considerably when the upstream margin is of intermediate magnitude. In contrast, the increased output of the affiliate does not increase downstream profit substantially when the affiliate's downstream margin is relatively small. Thus, the net effect of an increase in product differentiation is to reduce the profit of the integrated firm.
Because the integrated firm has only a mild preference to refrain from sabotage when products are homogeneous, the integrated firm can switch to preferring sabotage as products become slightly differentiated.
A corresponding non-monotonicity of cost-increasing sabotage does not arise in the linear setting with downstream Bertrand competition. 37 However, the qualitative conclusions reported in Observations 4.1 -4.4 hold in this setting. In particular, the integrated firm will either refrain from sabotage or undertake the foreclosure level of cost-increasing sabotage. 38 It will refrain from costincreasing sabotage if products are sufficiently differentiated (i.e., if ) and the upstream profit margin is positive (i.e., . The integrated firm will undertake the foreclosure level of cost-increasing sabotage when products are sufficiently homogeneous (i.e., when ), the upstream margin is positive ( ), and the affiliate's operating costs are no higher than the rival's (so ). This finding does not suggest that the possibility of sabotage by a vertically integrated producer should be ignored when designing public policy toward vertical integration. It suggests instead that 39. See Weisman (1998) for additional thoughts on this issue.
40. Regulators can also reduce incentives for sabotage by increasing the costs that an integrated producer incurs when it engages in sabotage. Regulators can devote more resources to monitoring sabotage and impose larger penalties if sabotage is detected, for example (Kang and Weisman, 2001 ).
-25 -in order to fully assess the likelihood and extent of sabotage, one should consider carefully both the types of sabotage that might be undertaken and the nature of the relevant downstream competition.
The findings also provide some guidance regarding the types of sabotage that merit the closest scrutiny if monitoring of sabotage is undertaken to limit its incidence.
Although we have extended the literature by examining both demand-reducing and costincreasing sabotage, further extensions remain to be pursued. One extension is to analyze other types of sabotage. For instance, as Economides (1998) suggests, some forms of sabotage might unavoidably affect the downstream operations of the integrated producer as well as the operations of rivals. 39 It is also possible that sabotage might serve primarily to raise a rival's cost of improving its service quality, rather than raising its marginal cost of production or directly reducing the demand for its product. Another extension that merits investigation is strategic pricing in conjunction with sabotage. It is apparent that an integrated supplier might undertake price discrimination to disadvantage downstream rivals (e.g., the supplier might charge rivals more for access than it charges its downstream affiliate). The supplier might also fail to implement legitimate cost-based price discrimination that would benefit rivals (Bernheim and Willig, 1996, p. 4.17) . It would be useful to determine the extent to which strategic pricing and (non-price) sabotage are complementary or substitute activities.
The optimal design of regulatory policy in vertically-related industries also merits careful study.
Our findings, along with others in the literature, suggest that there are conditions under which a regulator can mitigate incentives for sabotage by raising the price of the upstream product above its marginal cost of production. 40 Doing so increases the integrated firm's opportunity cost of engaging 41. Laffont and Tirole (2000, pp. 161-166) also note that pricing access at marginal cost may create incentives for exclusion. By adopting the proposal of the Coalition for Affordable Local and Long Distance Service on May 31, 2000, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has decided to move access charges rapidly toward the marginal cost of supplying access in the telecommunications industry (FCC, 2000) .
42
. Hinton et al. (1988) and Mandy (2000) discuss some related effects.
43. As Beard et al. (2001) suggest, the likely benefits and costs of fostering competition among upstream suppliers also merits careful consideration in any complete analysis of regulatory policy in verticallyrelated industries.
-26 -in sabotage that reduces the demand for the firm's upstream product. Thus, the standard prescription of marginal cost pricing for access may warrant reconsideration when the potential for sabotage is pronounced.
41
Incentives for sabotage may also be affected by the legal relationship between the upstream and the downstream units of the integrated firm. If the downstream firm is required to operate as a separate subsidiary, it may value the upstream profit generated by its purchases of the upstream product less highly than it otherwise would. Consequently, the downstream firm may increase the price it charges or reduce its output, thereby altering the nature of downstream competition. 42 All of the ramifications of a separate subsidiary requirement merit investigation in a complete model of optimal regulatory policy in industries with vertically integrated production. Such a model should also allow the regulator to expend resources in an attempt to detect, and thereby deter, sabotage.
43
It would be particularly useful to examine the design of regulatory policy in a setting where the regulator's knowledge of the industry is incomplete. In practice, an upstream producer often has privileged knowledge about its likely downstream operating costs and about its incentive and ability to sabotage the activities of its downstream rivals. The optimal manner in which to elicit this privileged information while limiting sabotage and increasing industry welfare is an important issue 44. Vickers (1995) and Lee and Hamilton (1999) examine the optimal design of industry structure in a setting with asymmetric information, but do not consider the possibility of sabotage.
-27 -for future research.
-A1 - . ( Proof of Observation 4.5.
APPENDIX
Notice from (A4.14) that , , and > 0.
Therefore, since is a cubic function of and since , it follows from (A4.14) and (A4.17) that the non-monotonicity cited in Observation 4.5 will occur if and only if the largest root of is strictly less than unity. It can be verified that the largest root of is strictly less than unity when, for example, = 10, = 0, = 9, , and = 0.2525. These parameter values ensure that is positive but close to zero at (i.e., at ) and declines below zero as is reduced below unity. As noted in the text, these parameter values ensure that declines as declines below unity.
